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ABSTRACT 
 
To what extent, following the decisions in Stack v Dowden1 and Abbott v 
Abbott,2 may a claimant acquire beneficial ownership in the family home 
under a constructive trust relying purely on domestic contributions as 
homemaker?  The writers examine this question against the background of 
single and joint ownership cases and suggest that, in the light of recent 
judicial pronouncements, the criteria for establishing a common intention 
constructive trust enunciated by Lord Bridge in Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset3 
may have been eroded so as to allow for a much broader inquiry of the 
claimant’s contributions to support a constructive trust.  In particular, it is 
submitted that this may allow the English courts to consider the same factors 
for both establishing and quantifying the claimant’s interest in the property 
which, in turn, may pave the way for a closer assimilation between single and 
joint ownership cases in this field. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This year, the landmark case of Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset4 comes of age. 
In Rosset, the House of Lords set a framework for ascertaining equitable 
ownership in the family home by means of a common intention constructive 
trust. In the 18 years since the decision, the social circumstances underpinning 
the case have continued to evolve. Unsurprisingly, the Rosset ruling has come 
under increasing attack, either by courts seeking to interpret its guidelines 
∗ Barrister, Teaching Fellow in Law, Department of Law, University of Greenwich. 
∗∗ Barrister, Professor of Property Law, Department of Law, University of Greenwich. 
1 [2007] UKHL 17, HL. 
2 [2007] UKPC 53, PC. 
3 [1991] 1 AC 107, HL. 
4 [1991] 1 AC 107, HL. 
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creatively5 or more directly, as in the equally significant House of Lords’ 
decision in Stack v Dowden.6  
Rosset concerned a wife attempting to defeat a third party creditor by 
means of an overriding interest under s 70(1)(g) of the Land Registration Act 
1925.7 In order to establish such a claim, she had first to demonstrate that she 
had acquired an equitable interest in the property which was registered in the 
sole name of her husband. Mrs Rosset had not made any financial 
contribution to the purchase price of the property, nor had there ever been any 
express discussions between her and her husband as to the beneficial 
ownership of the property.8 Lord Bridge delivered the leading speech and, 
after reviewing the authorities, identified two categories of common intention 
constructive trust, either of which, if established, would give a claimant an 
equitable interest in the property. The first is an express common intention 
constructive trust, based on actual discussions between the parties. 
Unfortunately for Mrs Rosset, the lack of express discussions closed this route 
of establishing such an equitable interest. Lord Bridge then went on to 
describe the circumstances in which the court could infer a common intention 
between the parties based on the conduct of the parties. In this situation, 
according to his Lordship, only direct financial contributions to the initial 
purchase price or subsequent mortgage instalments would suffice to support 
equitable entitlement. In Mrs Rosset’s case, such contributions were absent 
and her involvement in the subsequent improvement of the property was 
characterised as trivial and insignificant. Her claim was, therefore, dismissed.9
A similar problem is frequently encountered by a cohabitant who is 
seeking to establish an equitable share in the family home following a 
separation.  The most celebrated example is to be found in Burns v Burns,10 
where the claim also failed. Here, the female claimant had made no financial 
contributions towards purchase or mortgage payments but had contributed to 
housekeeping, children’s expenses and general domestic expenditure 
including the purchase of several domestic appliances.  Although the couple 
had lived together for 19 years and had two children together, the Court of 
Appeal rejected Mrs Burns’ claim to beneficial entitlement based solely on 
5 See, Le Foe v Le Foe [2001] 2 FLR 970. 
6 [2007] UKHL 17, HL. 
7 Now Sch 3, para. 2 of the Land Registration Act 2002. 
8 Indeed, the trustees of the husband’s family trust fund stipulated that the trust 
monies would only be released if the property was acquired in the sole name of the 
husband. 
9 Mrs Rosset may have had a claim in family law against Mr Rosset, but in this case it 
was important that she could claim that she had an interest in equity which bound the 
bank.   
10 [1984] Ch 317, CA. 
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her domestic contributions as homemaker.11 That was a decision made back 
in 1984 and the interesting question (posed throughout this article) is whether 
the Burns-type claimant would fare any better in the light of more recent 
English authority, which suggests that, in the words of Lord Walker12 in 
Stack, “the law has moved on” since Rosset.  
 
EXPRESS DECLARATION OF TRUST 
 
The most sensible approach for cohabiting partners to avoid disputes is to 
reach an agreement as to the beneficial interests in the property before 
purchase. This decision can then be recorded during the conveyancing process 
on the HM Land Registry TR1 Form.  This asks the prospective purchasers 
whether they wish to hold in equity as joint tenants or tenants in common and, 
if the latter, asks them if they wish to hold in equal shares. If they wish to hold 
the beneficial interest other than equally, there is an opportunity to specify the 
proportionate shares agreed. Despite widespread concern, however, the Land 
Registry has decided not to make this question compulsory in the recent 
reform of Land Registry forms.13  Indeed, many couples choose not to answer 
the question because they find it unpleasant to consider the end of a 
relationship at a time when they are living together happily.14
Where the parties go ahead and execute a trust expressly declaring their 
respective beneficial interests15 in the property, this will be conclusive of the 
parties’ common intention in the absence of some vitiating factor (e.g., 
misrepresentation, mistake16 or undue influence). In other words, the size of 
the parties’ respective shares will be determined according to the terms of 
their express trust regardless of their actual contributions to the purchase of 
11 See also, Midland Bank plc v Dobson [1986] 1 FLR 171 CA, where Mrs Dobson 
had used part of her earnings for household expenses, including the purchase of 
domestic equipment and did some ordinary periodic decorating. She also looked after 
the home and the parties’ two children. The Court of Appeal held that there was no 
nexus between her carrying out these household duties and the acquisition of the 
property. 
12 Ibid, at para 26. 
13 Explanatory Memorandum to the Land Registration (Amendment) Rules 2008. The 
Law Society opposed the suggestion that completing the TR1 should be compulsory. 
14 See further, Douglas, Pearce and Woodward, “Cohabitation and Conveyancing 
Practice: Problems and Solutions” [2008] Conv. 365. 
15 It should be noted, however, that an express trust may not declare the beneficial 
shares but merely state the intention to hold on trust. 
16 Bhatt v Bhatt, 3 April 2009, unreported, available on Lawtel.  See also, A Chandler, 
“Express Declarations of Trust, Rectification and Rescission: Goodman v Gallant 
Revisited” (2008) 38 Family Law 1210. 
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the property.17 A Burns claimant, therefore, who has made no financial 
contribution towards acquisition, will, nevertheless, be entitled to a beneficial 
share corresponding to that agreed between the parties and evidenced by their 
declaration of trust.18 Moreover, an express declared trust precludes the 
possibility of a supervening constructive or resulting trust based on 
subsequent differential contributions until the declared trust is varied by 
subsequent agreement.19   
What, however, is the position where no formal trust is executed declaring 
the equitable ownership of the property?  In this scenario, the cohabiting 
couple must rely on equity to resolve their difficulties. The route to be taken 
when cohabiting partners disagree about beneficial interests in the family 
home, depends primarily on whether, as in Rosset or Burns, the property is 
registered in the sole name of one of the partners, or the parties are joint 
registered proprietors, as in Stack. It will be convenient, therefore, to examine 
single and joint ownership cases separately. 
 
SINGLE OWNERSHIP CASES 
 
Express common intention 
 
It is conceivable that purely domestic contributions as homemaker may be 
enough to avail a claimant in establishing a common intention at the primary 
stage of the court’s inquiry, where he (or she) relies on express discussions 
between the parties as to their beneficial ownership. In the express common 
intention category, the court is not obliged to look for conduct from which an 
intention can be inferred, but only for conduct which “amounts to an acting 
upon it by the claimant”.20 In other words, in the express category, the 
common intention is already present and claimant’s conduct is only relevant 
to satisfy the requirement of detriment. Thus, in Rosset, Lord Bridge21 refers 
to detriment or a “significant alteration of position” in reliance on the 
17 Goodman v Gallant [1986] Fam 106. 
18 See, for example, Turton v Turton [1988] Ch. 542 and Wright v Johnson [2002] P 
& CR 210. An express declared trust of land must be “manifested and proved by 
some writing” in order to comply with the legal formalities set out in s 53(1)(b) of the 
Law of Property Act 1925. 
19 See, Goodman v Gallant [1986] Fam 106, per Slade LJ: “if the relevant conveyance 
contains an express declaration of trust which comprehensively declares the beneficial 
interests in the property or its proceeds of sale, there is no room for the application of 
the doctrine of resulting, implied or constructive trusts unless or until the conveyance 
is set aside or rectified.”  See also, Pink v Lawrence (1977) 36 P & CR 98, at 101, per 
Buckley LJ 
20 See, Grant v Edwards [1986] 1 Ch. 638, at 647, per Nourse LJ. 
21 [1991] 1 AC 107 at 132. 
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common intention. In this connection, the relevant conduct will often involve 
the incurring of expenditure which is referable to the acquisition of the house, 
but it need not necessarily always take this form.22
Let us suppose that, in Burns, the parties had expressly agreed that, 
despite the house being placed in the male partner’s sole name, the female 
partner was to have some share in the beneficial interest so as to reflect her 
contribution towards the care and upkeep of the family. If Mrs Burns had then 
acted on the faith of that common intention (by staying at home in order to act 
as homemaker and carer), would she be entitled to a proprietary interest in the 
house under an express common intention constructive trust?  In Grant v 
Edwards, the Court of Appeal expressed a difference of opinion as to what 
would qualify as conduct amounting to detriment in this category.  Nourse LJ 
opined that the conduct must be such that the claimant could not reasonably 
have expected to embark upon unless she was to have an interest in the 
house.23  His Lordship held that the claimant’s contribution to housekeeping 
expenses constituted an indirect financial contribution to the mortgage 
payments in so far as it enabled her male partner to pay them out of his own 
earnings. There was, therefore, in his view, a sufficient link between the 
contribution to housekeeping and the acquisition of an interest in the house. 
On the other hand, Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson suggested that: 
 
“…any act done by [the claimant] to her detriment relating to the joint 
lives of the parties is . . . sufficient to qualify. The acts do not have to 
be inherently referable to the house.”24
 
His Lordship noted that, in many cases, it may prove impossible to apply 
the test suggested by Nourse LJ because acts such as homemaking and child 
care may be linked to motives of affection as well as an intention to acquire 
an interest in the property.  The two were, therefore, inevitably interlinked. On 
Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson’s more relaxed formulation in Grant, 
however, such conduct would presumably qualify as “any act done by her to 
her detriment relating to the joint lives of the parties”25 notwithstanding that it 
22 See, for example, Levi v Levi, March 12 2008, unreported, available on Lawtel, 
where an open-ended loan at an uncommercially low level of interest was held to 
amount to sufficient detriment to support an express common intention constructive 
trust.  The deputy judge concluded (at para 56) that “detriment need not be great 
where there is an express agreement  . . .” 
23 Ibid, at 648. 
24 Ibid, at 657. 
25 Ibid, at 657. 
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was not, strictly speaking, referable to acquisition of the house.26  Indeed, his 
Lordship refers specifically to “contributions by way of labour or other 
unquantifiable actions” as being relevant.27 This view is reinforced by the 
notion that, in the express common intention category, detriment should be 
seen as broadly equivalent to that required to support a claim in proprietary 
estoppel.28  It should be stressed, however, that although detriment may have 
been more loosely interpreted in this way, its relevance (in the orthodox 
sense) only becomes significant if the court has proof of express discussions 
between the parties as to their beneficial entitlement. 
 
Inferred common intention 
 
In the absence of any finding of an agreement or arrangement between the 
parties to share beneficially, the court relies on the parties’ conduct both as a 
basis from which to infer a common intention and as the detrimental conduct 
relied on to give rise to a constructive trust.29 Unlike the express common 
intention category, therefore, the relevant conduct serves a dual purpose when 
determining whether the claimant has surmounted the first hurdle of 
establishing a constructive trust under Lord Bridge’s scheme in Rosset.  
In this situation, the court has to look for “expenditure which is referable 
to the acquisition of the house”.30 Thus, direct contributions to the purchase 
price, whether initially or by payment of mortgage instalments, will readily 
suffice. It is now also apparent (despite Lord Bridge’s apparent observations 
to the contrary in Rosset) that indirect contributions (in the shape of 
contributions to general household expenses thereby releasing the other 
party’s income to pay the mortgage instalments) may be capable of supporting 
a claim to a beneficial share under an inferred constructive trust.31  
26 In Rosset, Lord Bridge seems to accept this more relaxed formulation in so far as he 
refers to a mere “significant alteration in position” as supporting an express common 
intention: [1991] 1 AC 107 HL, at 137. 
27 Ibid, at 657. 
28 Significantly, in Rosset, Lord Bridge makes reference to the express category as 
giving rise to both a constructive trust and proprietary estoppel. In Grant, Sir Nicholas 
Browne-Wilkinson V-C, considered that “useful guidance” could be obtained from 
proprietary estoppel cases in this context: ibid, at 656. 
29 See, Grant v Edwards [1986] 1 Ch. 638, at 647, per Nourse LJ. 
30 Ibid, at 647. 
31 Le Foe v Le Foe [2001] 2 FLR 970. Interestingly, Lord Walker in Stack v Dowden  
[2007] UKHL 17, at para. 26, has added to the debate by expressly doubting whether 
Lord Bridge’s observation on this point “took full account of the views  . . . expressed 
in Gissing v Gissing.” His Lordship noted that this observation had “attracted some 
trenchant criticism” from academics as potentially productive of injustice. 
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It is insufficient, however, according to Burns, for the claimant to 
contribute merely towards household expenses simpliciter, purchase furniture 
or electrical appliances, or to do the housework, decorating or gardening, 
since such conduct does not manifest an intention of assisting the purchase of 
the house and, therefore, with the aim of acquiring some interest in the 
property.  The reasons for this restrained approach are twofold.  First, as 
mentioned earlier, it may be impossible to say whether or not the claimant 
would have done the acts relied on as detriment even if she thought she had 
no interest in the house. Conduct such as setting-up house together, having a 
baby, making payments to general household expenses (which are not strictly 
necessary to enable the mortgage to be repaid) and looking after the family 
are all treated as potentially referable to the mutual love and affection of the 
parties and not specifically referable to the claimant’s belief that she has an 
interest in the property.  This approach is typified by the following remarks of 
Fox LJ in Burns32: 
 
“...the fact that the parties lived together and do the ordinary domestic 
tasks, is, in my view, no indication at all that they thereby intended to 
alter the existing property rights of either of them… The undertaking 
of such work is, I think… the sort of things which are done for the 
benefit of the family without altering the title to the property.” 
 
An assertion that spousal and domestic services can alter property rights is 
seen essentially, as reverting to the idea of the “family asset”, which has been 
consistently rejected by the English courts, including the House of Lords in 
Pettit v Pettit33 and Gissing v Gissing.34 Secondly, it is also apparent that the 
English judiciary are mindful of the fact that the wide powers conferred by the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, in relation to the property of married persons, 
do not apply to unmarried couples. Hence, the court’s reluctance to take on 
board a broader-based jurisdiction to re-allocate property rights of de facto 
partners in the absence of specific statutory intervention.35
 
Significantly, his Lordship felt that, regardless whether Lord Bridge’s view was 
justified in 1990, the law had now moved on.  
32 Burns v Burns [1984] Ch. 317, CA, at 331.  See also, May LJ, at 345. See also, 
more recently, James v Thomas [2007] EWCA Civ 1212; Morris v Morris [2008] 
EWCA Civ 257 and Thomson v Humphrey [2009] EWHC 3576 (Ch). 
33 [1970] AC 777, HL 
34 [1971] AC 886, HL 
35 See, the remarks of May LJ in Burns v Burns [1984] Ch 317, at 333: “In my view, 
as Parliament has not legislated for the unmarried couple as it has for those who have 
been married, the courts should be slow to attempt in effect to legislate themselves.” 
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This stance has been reaffirmed most recently in Stack, where Lord 
Neuberger made clear that mere payments towards household bills and 
outgoings, or merely living together for a long time, or having children would 
not by themselves support an intention to alter beneficial entitlement where 
the parties had purchased the property in joint names. Such matters, in his 
view, were only relevant as “part of the vital background” in the sense of 
providing the context by reference to which any discussions or actions, 
subsequent to purchase, fell to be assessed by the court.  Presumably, the 
same approach (subject to what is said below) continues to apply to single 
ownership cases so that Burns remains good law in the context of a non-
owning claimant who seeks to claim a beneficial share based solely on 
homemaker contributions where there is no formal declaration of trust or 
evidence of any express discussions between the parties as to beneficial 
ownership.  
 
BLURRING THE BOUNDARIES 
 
The speeches in Stack, however, also evidence some blurring of the 
distinct boundaries between Lord Bridge’s rigid categorisation of common 
intention (whether express or inferred) and detriment in single ownership 
cases. On a liberal reading of the speeches of Lord Walker and Baroness Hale, 
in particular, there is some scope for arguing that domestic and spousal 
services now rank not only as factors in assessing the quantum of the parties’ 
beneficial interests but as contributions referable per se to the initial (or 
threshold) question as to whether there is the requisite common intention to 
support a constructive trust in the first place.  Lord Walker makes specific 
reference to Lord Bridge’s speech in Rosset stating that: “the law has [since] 
moved on” and suggesting that the House of Lords “should move it a little 
more in the same direction”.36  Later in his speech, he refers to the need to 
take “a wide view of what is capable of counting as a contribution towards the 
acquisition of a residence”. 37 This statement, however, appears to have been 
made in the context of the factors relevant to the question of quantification of 
the parties’ respective beneficial shares and not with specific reference to 
Lord Bridge’s second category of constructive trust in Rosset. Baroness Hale, 
on the other hand, after recognising that that “we are not in this case 
concerned with the first hurdle”, acknowledges that “there is undoubtedly an 
argument for saying that . . . the observations, which were strictly obiter dicta, 
of Lord Bridge . . . have set the hurdle rather too high in certain respects.”38 In 
her view, however, the point did not arise for consideration because a 
36 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17, at para 26. 
37 Ibid, at para. 34. 
38 Ibid, at para. 63. 
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conveyance into joint names (as in Stack) was sufficient in the majority of 
cases to surmount the first hurdle. Lord Neuberger, on the other hand, 
although recognising that it may be difficult in the abstract to identify the 
factors which can be taken into account to infer a common intention under the 
first hurdle, specifically refers to events occurring after the acquisition of the 
house which may alter the beneficial interests under the trust arising initially 
at the date of acquisition.  In this connection, he mentions a significant 
improvement to the home (the cost being seen as a capital expenditure) as 
justifying an adjustment of the parties’ beneficial ownership.  On the other 
hand, as noted earlier, mere payments towards household bills and outgoings, 
or merely living together for a long time, having children would not, in his 
view, by themselves support an intention to alter equitable entitlement. 
The first significant single ownership case after Stack was a Privy Council 
decision, Abbott v Abbott,39 with Baroness Hale once more delivering the 
leading judgment. Here, the Privy Council considered an appeal from the 
Court of Appeal of Antigua and Barbuda in respect of a wife’s claim for an 
equitable interest in the family home which had been conveyed into the 
husband’s sole name. Counsel on both sides unsurprisingly based their 
arguments on Rosset. Baroness Hale criticised the Court of Appeal for 
attaching “undue significance” to Lord Bridge’s dictum as to what 
contributions would qualify in the inferred common intention category and 
approached the issues of establishing and quantifying the equitable interest in 
a more robust way. The facts in Abbott would have allowed Baroness Hale to 
confirm that a constructive trust had indeed arisen in either of Lord Bridge’s 
categories. The husband agreed that the wife was entitled to an equitable 
interest in the family home (express common intention), and the wife had also 
made a direct financial contribution to the property via, inter alia, half of a 
wedding gift given to the couple (inferred common intention). Rather than 
focusing on either of these, however, Baroness Hale’s judgment suggests a 
more flexible route to establishing a common intention constructive trust, This 
involves taking into account the “parties' whole course of conduct in relation 
to the property… in determining their shared intentions as to its ownership.”40
Her Ladyship looked, in particular, at the behaviour of the parties during 
their marriage. In this connection, the couple organised their finances entirely 
jointly; they were jointly liable on the mortgage and had a joint bank account 
from which the loan repayments were made. She decided that this was 
evidence to support the conclusion that the parties’ common intention was to 
acquire an equitable interest in the property. This approach is interesting 
because, although such domestic details were used in Stack in the process of 
quantifying the parties’ shares in a joint ownership situation, in Abbott, the 
39 [2007] UKPC 53. 
40 Ibid, at 19 
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Privy Council used them to justify the acquisition of an equitable interest, 
with little or no reference to Lord Bridge’s familiar two-part test. 
The question then is – can the Abbott approach assist the Burns-type 
claimant? It is submitted, cautiously, that it may. Although in Abbott, as in 
Stack, the court concerned itself primarily with the parties’ financial – rather 
than domestic – arrangements, Baroness Hale makes clear that the parties’ 
“whole course of conduct in relation to the property” should be considered in 
determining their shared intentions. In particular, she listed a number of 
factors (other than just financial contributions towards the initial purchase or 
subsequent mortgage) which would be relevant including, notably, how the 
parties had agreed to arrange their finances and discharge the outgoings and 
household expenses. Her Ladyship also referred specifically to the question of 
whether the parties had children for whom they both had responsibility to 
provide a home. It is possible, therefore, in the future, that in single ownership 
cases, a claimant who has foregone paid employment to look after the home 
(Burns) or to renovate it (Rosset) may be more successful in establishing an 
equitable interest under this more relaxed route involving essentially the 
assimilation of the Rosset two-part test into just one composite inquiry into 
the parties’ whole course of dealings in relation to the property. It is submitted 
that the primary question in all such cases is the determination of the parties’ 
true intentions and, as Baroness Hale herself makes clear in Stack, this can 
only be properly determined by an examination of all the relevant 
circumstances. Significantly, according to her Ladyship, this includes “any 
advice or discussions at the time of transfer” (ie, the equivalent of express 
discussions pertinent to finding an express common intention in Lord Bridge’s 
first category constructive trust) as well as “how the purchase was financed 
both initially and subsequently” (ie, the equivalent of financial contributions 
relevant in determining whether an inferred common intention exists in Lord 
Bridge’s second category). The inescapable conclusion, it is submitted, is that 
the so-called “threshold question” enunciated in Rosset (ie, as to whether there 
is evidence from which to raise a common intention in the first place) has 
become largely superfluous given that the real (and only) question is simply to 
discern the parties’ common intention by reference to all the relevant 
circumstances.41
 
JOINT OWNERSHIP CASES 
 
In cases where the property is purchased in joint names, equitable 
ownership will follow the legal title so the courts will presume that the parties 
intended to share beneficial entitlement equally unless the claimant’s financial 
41 See Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17, at para 59, per Baroness Hale. 
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contributions (or improvements) to the property demonstrate a common 
intention that he (or she) is to have a greater or enlarged share.  
In Stack itself, the presumption of joint beneficial ownership was 
displaced by the fact that the claimant had contributed substantially more to 
the acquisition of the property both in terms of the initial outlay to the 
purchase money and subsequent capital repayments on the mortgage loan. It 
was significant also that the parties had never pooled their separate savings 
and investments. This aspect, in particular, pointed strongly against equal 
sharing. Similarly, in Adekunle v Ritchie42 the context of the purchase of the 
property was very different from that of a normal purchase in joint names.  
The purchase was of a council house by a tenant (the mother) with the benefit 
of a generous (50%) discount.  Her son was added to the purchase solely in 
order for her to be able to obtain a mortgage. The main reason for the 
purchase was to provide her with a home. As in Stack, the parties’ finances 
were kept separate. All these factors together pointed to the conclusion that 
the parties did not intend a joint beneficial tenancy. 
Significantly, however, the presumption of joint equitable ownership was 
upheld in the recent case of Fowler v Barron43 where the parties, an 
unmarried couple, bought a home in joint names without any formal 
declaration of trust or express discussions as to their beneficial entitlement. 
The male partner paid the deposit and the balance of the purchase price and 
acquisition costs. The mortgage was taken out in joint names, although the 
male partner paid all the mortgage instalments. The female partner, on the 
other hand, like the claimant in Burns, spent her income on herself and the 
children as well as on gifts, school clubs, trips and holidays.  The Court of 
Appeal concluded that, following Stack, a presumption of joint beneficial 
ownership arose from the fact that the couple were joint legal owners.  
Although it was open to either party to rebut that presumption, the relevant 
intention to support a constructive trust had to be the parties’ shared intention 
(actual or inferred) so that a secret (undisclosed) intention of the male partner 
(ie, that his female partner should only benefit in the event of his death and on 
the basis that they were still living together) had to be ignored. Moreover, the 
fact that the female partner had joined in the mortgage, notwithstanding that 
she was not expected to make any payment towards the discharge of the debt, 
was not inconsistent with the parties’ shared intention that she should be a 
joint beneficial owner. Her nominal role, therefore, in relation to the mortgage 
could not by itself displace the presumption. Moreover, the amount of the 
parties’ respective financial contributions was not decisive since: 
 
42 (2007) WTLR 1505, Leeds County Court. 
43 [2008] EWCA Civ 377. 
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“...in a family context, many more factors than financial contributions 
may be relevant to define the parties’ true intentions [including] ...the 
reasons why the home was acquired in the joint names, the purpose 
for which the home was acquired, the nature of their relationship and 
whether they had children for whom they had a shared responsibility 
to provide a home.”44
 
Critically, in this case, the fact that the parties had made mutual wills in 
each other’s favour pointed strongly to the conclusion that each party was to 
have a half beneficial interest. This aside, however, the case does establish 
that a Burns-type claimant may become entitled to an automatic half share in 
the property (notwithstanding the absence of any significant financial 
contributions to acquisition) based solely on legal title being placed in joint 
names. As Arden LJ made clear in Fowler, “if the contrary [is] not proved, the 
mere fact that the property was transferred into their joint names [is] enough 
to give both parties an equal beneficial share.”45 Interestingly, Ms Fowler, 
like Mrs Burns, had contributed 19 years to the life and well-being of the 
family in a number of different ways.  Unlike Mrs Burns, however, Ms 
Fowler was able to rely on her joint ownership of the home which 
automatically gave rise to a presumption of equal ownership in her favour. 
Again, in Rosset, had the parties purchased the property in joint names, then 
Mrs Rosset would have had no difficulty in establishing a constructive trust 
regardless of any contributions (trivial or otherwise) she may have made to 
the renovation works to the property. As in Fowler, she would automatically 
become entitled to half of the beneficial ownership. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The foregoing analysis suggests that the Burns claimant (i.e., one who has 
made no direct or indirect financial contribution towards acquisition or capital 
improvement of the property) will be able to claim a beneficial share by 
relying not only on a formal declaration of trust but also, alternatively, on an 
express common intention constructive trust.   
In single ownership cases (in the absence of a formal declared trust), the 
common intention may arise from actual discussions between the parties 
regarding beneficial ownership coupled with conduct which amounts to an 
acting upon the common intention by the claimant.46  It is submitted that, in 
this context, contributions as homemaker will suffice to support the 
constructive trust.  Applying the formula enunciated by Sir Nicholas Browne-
44 Ibid, per Toulson LJ, at para 56. 
45 Ibid, at para 34. 
46 See Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1388 and Grant v Edwards [1986] 1 Ch 638. 
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Wilkinson in Grant, it is enough that the detriment relates to the joint lives of 
the parties and need not be referable to the property itself.  In the inferred 
common intention category, however, orthodoxy would suggest that, in the 
absence of financial contributions towards acquisition, a Burns-type claimant 
would necessarily fail in satisfying the initial threshold hurdle enunciated in 
Rosset.47 This requirement, however, now appears to have been the subject of 
judicial relaxation both by the House of Lords in Stack and, more 
significantly, the Privy Council in Abbott.  Both these cases suggest a 
widening of the Rosset criteria necessary to support an inferred common 
intention constructive trust.  Indeed, in Abbott, despite being a single 
ownership case, there is no mention of the two-stage inquiry of first, 
establishing and, secondly, quantifying the claimant’s beneficial interest. The 
broad range of factors referred to in that case (ie, the husband’s admission that 
his wife was entitled to a beneficial share, a shared gift from the husband’s 
mother, joint liability on the mortgage and a joint bank account from which 
the loan repayments were made) appear to have sufficed for both establishing 
and quantifying the claimant’s interest at the same time.  This, of course, 
would mark a significant move away from the Rosset scheme and allow a 
Burns litigant to argue for a share in the home based on a much broader 
inquiry of her domestic and spousal contributions to the home and family. 
This, in turn, would allow for a much closer assimilation between single and 
joint ownership cases by the application of just a single composite test for the 
determination of the parties’ common intention (either at time of purchase or 
subsequently) by reference to the whole course of dealing between the parties.  
Indeed, it is submitted, that the claimant in Burns is no less deserving of a 
beneficial share than the litigant in Fowler.  In both cases, the claimants had 
made no financial contribution towards acquisition, but instead provided 
significant domestic and spousal services to the home and family during the 
period of cohabitation.  As in Burns, Ms Fowler spent her income on 
housekeeping expenses and the children with her male partner paying all the 
essential outgoings out of his own resources.  Unlike Fowler, however, Mrs 
Burns did not keep her own money in a separate account but pooled it with 
the allowance she received from her partner.  She also purchased fixtures and 
fittings, redecorated the whole house and paid for several consumer 
appliances including a dishwasher, washing machine and tumble dryer. Ms 
Fowler’s expenditure, on the other hand, was limited to day-to-day costs on 
food, seasonal gifts, school clubs and trips, some personal clothing, holidays 
and special occasions.  The fact of the matter is that, in the absence of the 
presumption that equity follows the law, Ms Fowler stands in no better 
47 See most recently, James v Thomas [2007] EWCA Civ 1212; Morris v Morris 
[2008] EWCA Civ 257 and Thomson v Humphrey [2009] EWHC 3576 (Ch). 
 
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS AND THE HOMEMAKER 
 
 
48 
                                                     
position than Mrs Burns in terms of her actual contributions to the home.  In 
this sense, it can be said that she was no more deserving of an interest in the 
property than Mrs Burns save, of course, for the parties’ notional intention to 
share equally arising from their legal ownership in joint names.  In other 
words, the outcome in Fowler is different only because that is what the court 
infers to be the parties’ common intention in joint ownership cases.  
Significantly, the same inference is not currently drawn in single ownership 
cases where the emphasis (in the absence of a declared trust or express 
discussions) is still on contributions of a capital nature only. Despite the 
potential broadening of the criteria relevant to determining the parties’ 
common intention enunciated both in Stack and Abbott, the orthodox position 
(following Rosset) is that purely domestic contributions will not by 
themselves be enough to give rise to a common intention except where there 
have been previous discussions between the parties or the parties have entered 
into a formal declaration of trust. This must be the inevitable conclusion if 
Burns and Rosset continue to govern the law in this area. 
Even if the Burns claimant is unable to rely on the mechanism of the 
constructive trust, it may still be possible to argue that the legal owner is 
estopped from denying the claimant’s belief that he (or she) would be given a 
proprietary interest in the property. In fact, there are several English decisions 
in the context of property rights of married (and unmarried) couples where 
proprietary estoppel has been invoked to award the claimant an equity in the 
house in single ownership cases. A notable example is to be found in Maharaj 
v Chand48 where the female claimant, in reliance on her male partner’s 
representations that the house would be a permanent home for her and the 
children, gave up her flat and used her earnings for household requirements 
and looked after the family. The Privy Council had no difficulty in holding 
that the claimant had established an estoppel equity to reside permanently in 
the property.  In the absence, however, of any assurance on the part of the 
legal owner, the claimant would not have fared any better than the female 
litigant in Burns.49   
There is currently a Cohabitation Bill in its 2nd reading before Parliament.  
If the Bill becomes law, then a former cohabitant will be able to apply to court 
for a financial settlement order in relation to the parties’ former family home. 
Although the claim will be based on status (rather than on the law of trusts), 
the court will be able to take a number of matters into account in determining 
whether to make an order, including (significantly) the contribution which 
each of the parties has made in the course of their living together as a couple, 
in particular, looking after the home or caring for any relevant child: clause 
9(d)(i).  Significantly also, the court will need to consider “any economic 
48 [1986] AC 898, PC Contrast, Coombes v Coombes [1986] 1 WLR 808. 
49 See for example, Windeler v Whitehall [1990] 2 FLR 505. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
49 
disadvantage to which, in consequence of having lived together as a couple, 
each of the parties remains subject or is likely to remain subject in the 
foreseeable future”: clause 9(f). This will, undoubtedly, have an important 
impact on the Burns claimant allowing the court, for the first time, to take into 
account on a statutory footing non-financial contributions as homemaker and 
child carer in determining beneficial entitlement.  Whether the Bill actually 
becomes law, however, is yet to be seen.  In the meantime, English law in this 
area continues to remain in a state of judicial flux.  
